I feel like there are two different notions of the word 'objective' at play here. One is the one you use, of whether there is a truth of the matter in moral questions or only 'thinking makes it so'. The other is whether, assuming that the truth of the matter exists, we have faculties that can arrive at said truth in some universally accepted manner. In the latter sense, there seems to be a true difference between mathematics and ethics. While there are long arguments to be had over what it means for a mathematical statement to be true, mathematical platonists and logicists can still happily agree on whether a particular proof is correct or not (I'd think). This is rather different when it comes to morality: for example, contemporary attempts to derive ethics from purely rational grounds are, ehm, not very successful, as Dawkins amply demonstrates.
So, even as a Christian, I find myself agreeing with Holland on two fronts: first, one needs to sort out the metaphysical groundwork first, before having even the possibility of objective moral truth (*if* you start from Humean premises, you'll end up with Humean conclusions). Second, not only are the metaphysical premises logically necessary, they have also proven to be necessary historically. Christ's teaching wasn't just reinforcing something that everyone already knew by the natural light, quite the opposite: it reshaped our moral sensibilities in fundamental ways. And, while the ethical tree can outlive its cultural-metaphysical roots for a while, eventually it withers and then [the history of the XX. century] follows. This is not to say that it is not objective in the sense you define, but it does have a revealed component that is not evident to reason alone - at least not in practice.
(As an aside, I think the case of abortion is a somewhat special, in that one can make a strong argument that *if* murder is wrong then so are abortions, other philosophical issues notwithstanding)
Hi Tibor, I'm sorry to be late in responding to this comment. I wanted to pick up on this bit here: "One needs to sort out the metaphysical groundwork first, before having even the possibility of objective moral truth..."
I think the point you're making here is one of ontology, not epistemology. I wouldn't disagree that God provides the ontological grounding of (e.g.) human value. However, we have epistemic access to the reality of human value even before we grant the ontological foundation.
On Christ's teaching reshaping moral sensibilities: I do agree it reshaped culture in that it took the Judaic ethic which was already in place (imago Dei) and modeled/cast the vision for an outworking of that ethic into "all the world." But I disagree that it was literally impossible for someone in the BC to know that certain things were wrong. I stick by my guns to that extent, that the natural light *has* always shone on these things and made them available "round the clock," so to speak.
Hi Esther, and thanks for the reply. I think we're in agreement that objective moral truth exists and it can be intuited. If I may belabor the point a bit more: The first concern I brought up is that within a broadly modern metaphysical framework, I don't think there is any way of interpreting that intuition as referring to anything objective (that's why I mentioned Hume and the is-ought problem). So I think that in a debate like this, you have to attack those assumptions first to make space for objective morality.
The second issue I think is more dire: how to distinguish correct intuitions from incorrect ones? The point about '2+2=4' works because mathematical intuition appears to be fairly universal. But imagine that there was as much variation in what is considered accepted mathematics as there is in ethics (Achilles and the tortoise come to mind). How do we settle such a debate other than 'my intuition is correct and yours is wrong'? I admit I don't have a fully satisfying answer to this - if you have any thoughts on it, I'd be very interested.
Right, I suppose I've always just been quite placid on the "universality problem" when it comes to ethics. It costs nothing for me to affirm that 2 + 2 = 4, whereas it may cost very much to follow the moral law. On the flip side, there can be plenty of incentive to break that law, or to build a system of cultural conditioning on its denial. In light of that, shouldn't we positively *expect* to see wide variation?
Yeah, I don't think explaining the existence of variation is itself an issue. The problem is more that if such influences can cloud moral intuition, it's not obvious how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Some cases might be fairly straightforward - as you say, there is plenty of incentive to pretend certain laws don't exist - but even if I try to weed out those, I find it hard to believe (as much as I would like) that all *my* sincerely held ethical beliefs are due to an unerring moral intuition, and its only those who disagree with me that are victims of cultural conditioning. At least I'm sure that they think the same.
I certainly hope you don't feel that sort of diffidence around propositions like "Killing babies is wrong," "Suicide is wrong," "Euthanasia is wrong," or even if we want to venture into sexual ethics, "Sodomy is wrong." Let me encourage you to not be diffident in such matters!
I mean, if we doubted our ability to judge anything, we'd go about unable to choose one belief over another in any context! I mean isn't this sort of like its own version of "Ah yes but if you'd been born a Muslim you wouldn't be a Christian though"? I never see the argumentative point there either. If I am independently convinced that Christianity is true, then who cares?
I admit, I do occasionally doubt our ability to judge anything (j'accuse Descartes). But I agree: *if* we can be independently convinced of the truth, then all of this is mute. It seems to me though that that requires some external reference frame to which intuition can be compared. So I would say that we need some combination of intuition/reading scripture/reasoning from first principles that might all be prone to errors on their own but can serve to cross-check one another.
For the concrete examples, your encouragement is well received. I certainly have little doubt about the ethical implications of killing babies. Same for suicide or euthanasia, although for those, sorting out why they are wrong requires a more explicit appeal to God I think. Sexual ethics is a murky topic, I suppose it depends on where exactly you draw the boundaries of what counts as 'sodomy'. But that's probably a discussion for another time.
I feel like there are two different notions of the word 'objective' at play here. One is the one you use, of whether there is a truth of the matter in moral questions or only 'thinking makes it so'. The other is whether, assuming that the truth of the matter exists, we have faculties that can arrive at said truth in some universally accepted manner. In the latter sense, there seems to be a true difference between mathematics and ethics. While there are long arguments to be had over what it means for a mathematical statement to be true, mathematical platonists and logicists can still happily agree on whether a particular proof is correct or not (I'd think). This is rather different when it comes to morality: for example, contemporary attempts to derive ethics from purely rational grounds are, ehm, not very successful, as Dawkins amply demonstrates.
So, even as a Christian, I find myself agreeing with Holland on two fronts: first, one needs to sort out the metaphysical groundwork first, before having even the possibility of objective moral truth (*if* you start from Humean premises, you'll end up with Humean conclusions). Second, not only are the metaphysical premises logically necessary, they have also proven to be necessary historically. Christ's teaching wasn't just reinforcing something that everyone already knew by the natural light, quite the opposite: it reshaped our moral sensibilities in fundamental ways. And, while the ethical tree can outlive its cultural-metaphysical roots for a while, eventually it withers and then [the history of the XX. century] follows. This is not to say that it is not objective in the sense you define, but it does have a revealed component that is not evident to reason alone - at least not in practice.
(As an aside, I think the case of abortion is a somewhat special, in that one can make a strong argument that *if* murder is wrong then so are abortions, other philosophical issues notwithstanding)
Hi Tibor, I'm sorry to be late in responding to this comment. I wanted to pick up on this bit here: "One needs to sort out the metaphysical groundwork first, before having even the possibility of objective moral truth..."
I think the point you're making here is one of ontology, not epistemology. I wouldn't disagree that God provides the ontological grounding of (e.g.) human value. However, we have epistemic access to the reality of human value even before we grant the ontological foundation.
On Christ's teaching reshaping moral sensibilities: I do agree it reshaped culture in that it took the Judaic ethic which was already in place (imago Dei) and modeled/cast the vision for an outworking of that ethic into "all the world." But I disagree that it was literally impossible for someone in the BC to know that certain things were wrong. I stick by my guns to that extent, that the natural light *has* always shone on these things and made them available "round the clock," so to speak.
Agree with your point on abortion.
Hi Esther, and thanks for the reply. I think we're in agreement that objective moral truth exists and it can be intuited. If I may belabor the point a bit more: The first concern I brought up is that within a broadly modern metaphysical framework, I don't think there is any way of interpreting that intuition as referring to anything objective (that's why I mentioned Hume and the is-ought problem). So I think that in a debate like this, you have to attack those assumptions first to make space for objective morality.
The second issue I think is more dire: how to distinguish correct intuitions from incorrect ones? The point about '2+2=4' works because mathematical intuition appears to be fairly universal. But imagine that there was as much variation in what is considered accepted mathematics as there is in ethics (Achilles and the tortoise come to mind). How do we settle such a debate other than 'my intuition is correct and yours is wrong'? I admit I don't have a fully satisfying answer to this - if you have any thoughts on it, I'd be very interested.
Right, I suppose I've always just been quite placid on the "universality problem" when it comes to ethics. It costs nothing for me to affirm that 2 + 2 = 4, whereas it may cost very much to follow the moral law. On the flip side, there can be plenty of incentive to break that law, or to build a system of cultural conditioning on its denial. In light of that, shouldn't we positively *expect* to see wide variation?
Yeah, I don't think explaining the existence of variation is itself an issue. The problem is more that if such influences can cloud moral intuition, it's not obvious how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Some cases might be fairly straightforward - as you say, there is plenty of incentive to pretend certain laws don't exist - but even if I try to weed out those, I find it hard to believe (as much as I would like) that all *my* sincerely held ethical beliefs are due to an unerring moral intuition, and its only those who disagree with me that are victims of cultural conditioning. At least I'm sure that they think the same.
I certainly hope you don't feel that sort of diffidence around propositions like "Killing babies is wrong," "Suicide is wrong," "Euthanasia is wrong," or even if we want to venture into sexual ethics, "Sodomy is wrong." Let me encourage you to not be diffident in such matters!
I mean, if we doubted our ability to judge anything, we'd go about unable to choose one belief over another in any context! I mean isn't this sort of like its own version of "Ah yes but if you'd been born a Muslim you wouldn't be a Christian though"? I never see the argumentative point there either. If I am independently convinced that Christianity is true, then who cares?
I admit, I do occasionally doubt our ability to judge anything (j'accuse Descartes). But I agree: *if* we can be independently convinced of the truth, then all of this is mute. It seems to me though that that requires some external reference frame to which intuition can be compared. So I would say that we need some combination of intuition/reading scripture/reasoning from first principles that might all be prone to errors on their own but can serve to cross-check one another.
For the concrete examples, your encouragement is well received. I certainly have little doubt about the ethical implications of killing babies. Same for suicide or euthanasia, although for those, sorting out why they are wrong requires a more explicit appeal to God I think. Sexual ethics is a murky topic, I suppose it depends on where exactly you draw the boundaries of what counts as 'sodomy'. But that's probably a discussion for another time.